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Mary conveyed her diverse thoughts and pleas with a lively 
pen, and Mr. Tahta’s selections are good. Her discussion of the 
value of play-methods to open the child mind to mathematics still 
has relevance. And she was rightly concerned to broaden the 
treatment of algebra in the classroom (although to label its 
neglect “a fruitful source of insanity” seems a little harsh). 
On t.he other hand her promotion of the mystically minded French 
logician, Alphonse Gratry , reads hollowly under modern eyes. 
The booklet has a useful introduction and ends with a 
bibliography and some notes on the people mentioned. The last 
sentence of the text proper is worth quoting here: “But if England 
takes no interest in the question whether its young men of abnormal 
genius shall lay themselves on the altar of National Reform or 
rot away in mere phosphorescent decadence, why was Oscar Wilde 
condemned to prison, and why do we perform religious services in 
honour of Jesus of Nazareth?” Figure that one out. 
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As A. C. Crombie has pointed out, Galileo has long been a 
philosophical symbol. In the 19th century for example he was 
diversely regarded as a Kantian rationalist, an empiricist 
anticipator of Mill, a founder of the “positive philosophy,” and 
a Machian phenomenalist. In the early 20th century, he naturally 
became the father of the hypothetico-deductive-experimental 
method . More recent historians such as J. H. Randall (and 
Crombie himself) link Galileo to Aristotelian sources. On the 
other hand, Koyr6 and his followers insist upon Galileo’s Platonism, 
and fresh interpretations and reinterpretations continue to appear. 
Since evidence for all these views may be found in Galileo’s copious 
writings over a period of some 50 years, and since those who hold 
different views of science tend to see in his writings just those 
passages which support their own philosophy, we continue to be 
presented with a number of different--and quite incompatible-- 
Galileos. If we are ever to extract the real man from his 
symbolic images we must seek to understand rather than to ignore 
the many contradictions in his works and correspondence and try 
to put together a less tidy picture which can include those 
pieces that refuse to fit neatly into a consistent whole. For 
this we need more extensive and more detailed analyses of exactly 
what Galileo said and did and of the immediate background and 
context of each of his writings. 
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William R. Shea’s book is an important contribution to such 
a project. In addition to Galileo’s writings, both published 
and unpublished, Shea has explored a vast amount of correspondence 
and other writings of the period, and from this he has reconstruc- 
ted the context of Galileo’s researches and the controversies 
surrounding him in the period between 1610 and 1632. Equa 1 ly 
diligent in examining the content of Galileo’s works, Shea has 
broken new ground in his detailed and acute studies of three 
minor but critical writings--The Discourse on Floating Bodies, 
the Letters on Sunspots, and The Assayer. He has also given us 
a useful guide through the labyrinth of the Dialogue Concerning 
the Two Chief World Systems. Several chapters of Shea’s book 
have appeared in earlier versions as separate articles, but it 
is by no means simply a collection of previously published 
essays. There is important new material, and the whole is 
organized around theses concerning Galileo’s method and philoso- 
phy of science, set against a background of the general intel- 
lectual climate of the time. 
Shea’s book is extraordinarily readable. He commands a 
literary style which enables him to handle complicated and subtle 
matters with clarity and brevity. Thus he leads his readers 
through complex material from which they can gain real under- 
standing of Galileo’s scientific procedures and the motivation 
behind various developments. For example, in discussing a key 
theorem in the Discourse on Floating Bodies Shea quotes from an 
earlier version found in Galileo’s manuscript. Then comparing two 
different proofs of the theorem, he shows that Galileo discovered 
an error made earlier and subsequently reworked his treatment of 
this subject so as to make use of ideas stemming from the ancient 
Mechanica of Pseudo-Aristotle as well as from Archimedes, his 
chief guide in mechanics. Shea also speculates that Galileo’s 
discovery of his error led him to pay closer attention to the 
use of experiments, and Shea’s brief but concise account gives 
genuine insight into these important developments. Similarly, 
in the Letters on Sunspots, Shea sets forth the central arguments 
in such fashion as to show with admirable clarity the precise 
way in which Galileo used geometry to explore and demonstrate 
the mathematical properties of sunspots. Here and elsewhere, 
however, Shea does not evade the problem of Galileo’s errors 
and blind spots. Especially in the controversy over the nature 
of comets, we are able to see how Galileo, even as his Aristoteliar 
opponents, could be led into error by his own philosophical and 
scientific commitments. Shea enables us to follow Galileo’s 
various maneuvers, sometimes underhanded, sometimes almost comic, 
which are aimed at undermining those arguments by opponents 
(particularly Tycho Brahe) for which Galileo has no adequate 
answer. 
In addition to the minor works of the middle period, Shea 
also analyzes the four days of Galileo’s Dialogue. Here, he 
is dealing with a work about which more has been published and 
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there is less that will strike most readers as new. Again, however 
Shea’s analysis is invaluable for its illumination of the back- 
ground against which the Dialogue was written, and for its clarity 
and objectivity. Under Shea’s treatment, Galileo is no longer 
a symbolic scientist but a real investigator, capable of incon- 
sistencies, contradictions, and confusions, making mistakes, going 
up blind alleys, changing his arguments to confound his opponents. 
We are brought measurably closer to an understanding of this 
key figure in 17th century science. 
But if Shea’s Galileo is a real investigator of nature, 
he remains an idealized philosopher of science. In contrast 
with the fresh, living presentation of Galileo the scientist, 
Shea’s philosophical analysis, albeit well-reasoned, insightful, 
and extraordinarily lucid, is less original and again leaves us 
with a symbolic Galileo. In fact, Shea follows what is essential- 
ly (and admittedly) Alexander Koyre’s interpretation of Galileo 
as Platonist and mathematicist. Shea deals with a wider range 
of Galileo’s works than did Koyre’, and he subjects them to a finer 
analysis . The result is a modification of Koyre. Shea recognizes 
the limited and uncertain nature of Galileo’s Platonism and the 
presence of non-Platonic elements in the new philosophy. But what 
Koyre’ taught was not simply that Galileo was a Platonist, but 
that he was Platonist rather than Aristotelian, and his analysis 
focuses on this opposition. Shea’s analysis, too, seems to be 
largely confined to this same opposition. But is this still a 
fruitful way in which to examine Galileo’s philosophical thought? 
In the Letters on Sunspots, Galileo explicitly denies that we 
can know the essence of things, saying that we must be content 
with the knowledge of only some of their properties, or “accidents. 
Shea has some interesting things to say about this passage, but 
does it, as he says, stand on its head the usual Aristotelian 
doctrine that we can know the essences of earthly substances but 
not that of heavenly bodies? Does Galileo’s “vindication” of 
the “validity of ‘accidental ’ knowledge for the whole realm of 
nature” (p. 71) mean that he would identify knowledge of “real 
accidents” with that of the ultimate reality? Or did Galileo mean 
to distinguish between our ability to know the essences of things 
(why things are as they are) and our capacity for understanding 
mathematics and the mathematical structure of things? When 
Galileo makes his distinction between real and unreal “accidents” 
(later known as primary and secondary qualities), does he intend 
to eliminate the category of substance and thus reduce all of 
reality to “real accidents”? Rather than a Platonic claim that 
it is through mathematics that we come to know the essential 
nature of things, is it possible that what we have here is a 
distinction between mathematical knowledge and knowledge of the 
reality that underlies the physical world which is closer to 
some form of scepticism than to either Platonism or Aristotelian- 
ism? 
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In fact, Galileo’s philosophical position is very complex. 
Besides deep difficulties in fitting him into any particular 
philosophical school, there are numerous contradictions, both 
real and apparent, in his scattered remarks of a philosophical 
nature. ‘i’llis is surely in part because Galileo’s views changed 
during his long working life. Also, the controversy with the 
Church over the Copernican system forced Galileo increasingly 
to insist upon the validity of observation and experience. Then, 
from 1616 on, Galileo’s work was carried out under restrictions. 
After that time Galileo developed a new style for presenting his 
views, which he often obscured by use of Socratic irony, profes- 
sions of ignorance and other literary devices. The Dialogue in 
particular is full of traps for those who collect passages to sup- 
port some tidy view of Galileo the philosopher. Finally, it must 
be remembered that although Galileo was a philosopher within the 
meaning of the term in his time, he did not direct his main effort 
towards construction of a philosophical system but rather to the 
solution of technical scientific problems. Metaphysical consider- 
ations may have led him to adopt Copernican astronomy and pos- 
sibly even to develop his new mechanics. But in carrying out his 
program he may well have selected his conceptual tools for prac- 
tical reasons more often than from a theory of science or from 
a well thought out philosophical position. 
Shea shows that he is aware of the complexities of his 
subject, but perhaps he is himself too much the philosopher to 
resist the temptation of reconstructing for Galileo a consistent 
and coherent philosophical view. This tendency is particularly 
clear in Shea’s treatment of Galileo’s scientific method as a 
single method employed throughout the middle period and in the 
different sciences. The result is that in Shea’s analysis of 
Galileo’s earlier works in that period he must force two quite 
different procedures into a single Procrustean bed, and he misses 
some significant developments that take place later. In his 
analysis of Galileo’s scientific method (singular), Shea explains, 
for example, that: 
(1) “What qualifies as a scientific explanation for Galileo is 
i2j 
a mathematical theory verifiable in nature” (p. 166). 
“Framing exact hypotheses is only the first step in science,” 
whereas the “second one is deriving practical conclusions from 
them and devising well-chosen experiments to test them” (p. 39). 
(3) The importance of experiments lies in their “discriminatory 
role in the selection of the set of principles that will be used 
as the basis of a physical interpretation of nature” (p. 39). 
(4) Experiments have to be “well-chosen,” but one such is suf- 
ficient to confirm a theory, “provided the theory was mathematical- 
ly articulated and yielded forecasts about the behavior of physi- 
cal objects” (p. 44). 
(5) The regulative use of experiment is “restricted to cases which 
were not rigorously deduced from certain principles” (p. 44). 
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Attempting to characterize Galileo’s method (singular) in 
terms of such formulae, Shea conflates two quite distinct method- 
ological procedures. In the Discourse on Floating Bodies, in 
which experiment functions as in (3) , Galileo deduces “true” 
consequences from principles rendered certain by reason, observa- 
tion, or illustrative experiments. Experiments have a “discrimina- 
tory” role in the selection of principles, but they are not “regu- 
lative.” This is the case which Shea quite rightly excludes 
in (5). Once the principles have been rendered evident (as Shea 
observes, Galileo seems to follow Plato in stressing the function 
of experience in the “awakening” of dormant knowledge), the re- 
sults follow rigorously. The principles are not hypotheses and 
are not subject to disconfirmation. Galileo knows very well, for 
example, that he cannot experimentally confirm his proposition 
that a thick slab of lead would float in water if it could be 
lowered into the liquid to proper depth without its top getting 
wet. This theorem, rigorously deduced from “true” principles, 
is necessarily true even though it yields no forecasts “about the 
behavior of physical objects.” The last clause in statement 
(4) does not apply here. But in the Letters on Sunspots, composed 
about the same time, Galileo’s attitude is entirely different. 
He feels perfectly justified in heaping scorn upon those who would 
deny the evidence of their sense in order to preserve their prin- 
ciples. For, in the study of astronomical phenomena, unlike 
mechanics, one cannot begin from evident principles established 
by reason and experience. Here one must frame hypotheses and 
test the conclusions derived from them. Statement (1) applies 
to the arguments on sunspots but not to the theorem on hydro- 
statics . Statement (2)) like (4)) conflates the two procedures. 
Thus in his earlier works Galileo seems to make an implicit 
distinction between a rational (“a priori”) science and one 
which is empirical (“a posteriori”). Galileo, of course, does not 
use ” a priori” or “a posteriori” to indicate this distinction 
but sometimes uses the terms “demonstrative” and “mathematical” 
to indicate “a priori” sciences. By this, however, he does not 
intend to exclude the use of mathematical demonstration from 
other sciences, such as astronomy. The distinction depends on 
whether consequences are derived from evident principles or from 
hypotheses. Galileo, of course, insisted on the efficacy of 
mathematical demonstrations everywhere, and he often speaks, in 
this context, of a single method for all sciences. But in his 
earlier writings, such remarks are better understood as references 
to the use of mathematics rather than to identical logical struc- 
tures . He does, however, gradually abandon the logical distinc- 
tion for several reasons. Among these are the demand by the Church 
for a necessary proof of the earth’s motion, the need for a self- 
evident mechanical principle in astronomy (circular inertia) to 
account for the behavior of objects on or near the surface of the 
earth, and Galileo’s long, but frustrated, efforts to find self- 
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evident principles for the foundation of his new science of mo- 
tion. In the end, a principle nota da se has been introduced 
into astronomy , whereas the postulate on which Galileo grounds his 
mechanics is to be established by confirmation of conclusions 
derived from it. Thus astronomy, which ought to be “a posteriori,” 
looks as though it may become an “a priori” science, and mechanics, 
which ought to be an “a priori” science, looks to be “a posteriori. 
Perhaps for this reason, Galileo did eventually articulate a 
single, unified method for all the sciences which employ mathe- 
matics. In the third day of the Discourses on Two New Sciences, 
Galileo lumps together music, optics, mechanics, astronomy, and 
the like, and he stipulates a single logical procedure for all: 
their principles, confirmed by “sensory experience,” become the 
foundation for the resulting structure. But there remain ambigui- 
ties and inconsistencies when we confront this claim with Galileo’s 
actual procedures. The postulate in the treatise on local motion, 
for example, is never established in the manner promised. What 
Shea sees as Galileo’s method during the period from 1610-1632 
follows only by hindsight and extrapolation, and thus in his anal- 
ysis the ambiguities and contradictions which have led to so many 
diverse interpretations disappear. Galileo is again idealized 
and an important phase in the history of scientific method is 
obscured. 
Another gap in Shea’s treatment of method may be worth 
mentioning. He dismisses without discussion the use of what 
Galileo refers to as the “laws of logic” from which he makes in- 
ferences from effects to causes. One instance is brushed aside 
as a “witty retort rather than a statement about method” (p. 51). 
The rest are simply ignored. Now, it must be admitted that the 
importance of such methods (roughly, Mill’s methods, earlier forms 
of which appear in Ockham and Bacon) in the development of modern 
science has been greatly exaggerated in the past. But these 
methods did, after all, have a long run, and to deny them any 
importance at all may be a distortion of equal magnitude. At 
the very least it should be mentioned that Galileo began referring 
to such methods in the middle period, and that they furnish the 
underlying logical structure of some important arguments in the 
Dialogue and in the Discourses on Two New Sciences. Take, for 
example, Galileo’s argument for the earth’s motion based on the 
phenomenon of the tides. As usual in arguments dealing with 
astronomy, Galileo attempts to establish his hypothesis by show- 
ing that it accounts for observational data and by arguing that 
no other reasonable hypothesis does so, But the details of his 
argument do not consist in rigorous deductions of particular 
propositions to be verified by observations, as in the Letters 
on Sunspots, but in a set of loosely connected arguments that what 
he has supposed to be the cause increases and decreases in the 
same periodic manner as the effects to be explained. (In fact, 
tihat he invokes as a principle here is the method of concomitant 
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variations ! ) Physics, astronomy , and mechanics are not yet seen 
as a single mathematical science which simply derives testable 
consequences from hypotheses, and causes are not yet reduced to 
statistical correlations. Galileo’s employment of special logical 
“laws” for deriving causes from effects surely merits some at- 
tention in a detailed examination and commentary on his scientific 
method, especially where special emphasis has been placed on 
his argument from the tides. 
In spite of these caveats, it must be emphasized that in 
Shea’s Galileo we have the clearest and most accurate picture 
yet available. The faults in his study are in large part due to 
its restricted scope, and this is hardly serious. For if Galileo’s 
philosophy and method of science cannot be properly understood by 
limited examination of only a few works, neither can it be made 
intelligible by a massive compilation of undigested description 
of everything he wrote. Whether or not science proceeds by con- 
jecture and refutation, history of science certainly does. Shea 
has dug deeply into critical areas and has tried--with singular 
success-to make his results intelligible and coherent. His 
analyses exhibit a rare combination of sound scholarship and a 
gift for molding his material into a manageable form which will 
be of help to general readers and scholars alike. It is also 
valuable to have such a fine presentation of Galileo in the tra- 
dition of Koyrg, whose seminal work, the Etudes Galilgennes has 
never been translated into English. 
Today some of KoyrO’s key assumptions and analyses are under 
serious attack, but his work is still of central importance in 
Galileo studies. Similarly, even if some of Shea’s conclusions 
should have to be modified, the main content of his book will 
remain of permanent value as notes towards a definition of 
Galileo’s philosophy and methodology. 
